In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to 'anti-herding', i.e., they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others' recommendations. I also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless.
I find that in the unique equilibrium of the model, the decision maker excessively contradicts the prior. Even when she believes that the prior is correct, she may go against it, a behavior which I term 'anti-herding'. 6 Intuitively, if the decision maker takes an action that follows the public prior, she reveals that her own information may not be accurate enough. If, however, the decision maker's action goes against the prior, or against the herd, she suggests that her own information is at least as accurate as the prior. Thus, going against public information can serve as a signal about ability, which implies that decision makers have an excessive incentive to use it. Thereby in equilibrium they distort their actions in this direction.
In the model, I also allow the decision maker to decide how much information to aggregate before taking her decision. 7 That is, she can choose to consult an adviser who provides public advice. I find that the most able decision makers choose not to consult, inefficiently.
In particular, the signal of anti-herding can be substituted by the signal of not gathering information at all. Intuitively, if the decision maker chooses not to check the content of available information, she shows even a greater confidence in her ability. I then compare between the two types of signals, that of not soliciting information and that of contradicting available information. I find that decision makers behave even less efficiently when they use the signal of not soliciting information.
Finally, I ask whether advisers to the decision maker indeed report their information truthfully. If such an adviser has career concerns himself, he may wish to pose as a talented type and hence manipulate his recommendation. I show that advisers bias their recommendations even if they do not have career concerns but care only about the outcome. It is the anticipated anti-herding behavior of the decision maker which induces them to distort their recommendations. Thus, career concerns of either agent, be it the adviser or the decision maker, are sufficient to induce sub-optimal sharing of information.
Anti-herding results are derived in the literature in several contexts and under a variety of assumptions. I find that in terms of the decision maker's objectives, the decision maker managers. This accords with the career concerns view of Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), in which the wage is a function of the market's perception of the ability of the manager. A different type of career concerns arises when agents are induced to signal their preferences, instead of their ability. This type of career concerns is analyzed for example by Morris (2000) . 6 Herding is defined as the behavior of decision makers who follow others' recommendations while ignoring their own information (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Banerjee, 1992 ). 7 As far as I know, no other paper analyzes whether managers solicit advice or information in the context of career concerns. must be motivated by career concerns. I illustrate though that anti-herding arises even if the decision maker has only reputation concerns and does not care about the outcome at all. For example, Prendergast and Stole (1996) analyze a dynamic model in which managers initially overreact to their own information compared to a common market prior, and then 'herd' relative to their own previous decisions later in their career. In their model they assume sufficiently high outcome concerns. I show that reputation concerns alone are sufficient.
In my setting, career concerns are individualistic. That is, the decision maker cares only about the perception of the evaluator about her type. There is no direct competition with other managers in the market. Given that career concerns are individualistic, I show that a necessary condition for anti-herding is that the decision maker knows her type. Intuitively, when the decision maker does not know her type, she can only signal it by taking the correct decision, which accords with efficiency. Hence, anti-herding cannot arise. 8 Indeed, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who initiated the reputational herding literature, assume that decision makers do not know their type and find that herding may arise. 9 Avery and Chevalier (2001), however, show that when the decision maker has sufficient information about her type, the resulting behavior is anti-herding. In their paper they assume that the information of able agents is correlated. This assumption, as my model illustrates, is not important for the derivation of anti-herding. Trueman (1994) was the first to set up a model in which an expert knows her type and tries to signal it to the market. His model is essentially a two-type model and as a result he derives anti-herding only for some parameters. 10 Here I generalize anti-herding results found in Trueman (1994) , Avery and Chevalier (2001) and Prendergast and Stole (1996) for any distribution over types and for various assumptions about the information held by the players. 11 In addition, I extend this literature by analyzing 8 The literature on reputation is split on the assumption whether agents know their type or not. Holmström (1982) and Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986) assume that agents do not know their type, whereas Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) assume that agents do know their type. 9 They assume that information among smart managers is correlated as opposed to untalented managers.
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000), however, prove that the assumption of correlated information among talented managers is not necessary for the derivation of herd behavior; decision makers who do not know their type, can signal it only by taking the right decision. Thus, herd behavior arises in the presence of career concerns, exactly as in the models in which decision makers simply care about taking the correct action (see Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992) . 10 A version of his model can be found in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2002) . 11 In particular, I show that anti-herding arises also if the evaluator does not observe the state of the world, and when the evaluator or the decision maker do not observe the accuracy of the prior.
other implications of anti-herding, such as how it affects advisers to the decision maker and her inclination to consult at all. anti-herding in a set up in which decision makers do not know their type.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and a benchmark analysis of an efficient decision maker. Section 3 presents the main result; I derive the antiherding result and its generalizations. Section 4 extends the model by allowing the decision maker to decide how much information to aggregate and also examines how much information advisers provide to the decision maker. Section 5 concludes and the appendix contains all proofs, which are not in the text.
The model
The players and the action space
There are two players in the game, a decision maker D, and an evaluator E. The decision maker must take an action, a. For simplicity, suppose there are only two possible actions, a ∈ {l, h}. D gains utility from advancing her career. That is, if E believes that D is an able decision maker, she can be rewarded with high wages or a promotion. Hence, the decision maker tries to signal to E that she is able. E, on the other hand, tries to guess the decision maker's true type or 'ability'. E's action is therefore to form beliefs on the type of D, as will be explained below.
The information structure
There is an underlying state of the world w, which is unknown and is realized only after the action a is taken. There are two possible states, which are also denoted by l or h.
Let action l be appropriate in state l and action h be appropriate in state h. There is a common knowledge prior distribution on the states of the world. The prior can summarize previous public information, such as other's actions or recommendations. In particular, let
Pr(w = h) = q, for q ∈ (.5, 1) whereas Pr(w = l) = 1 − q.
(i) The information of D : The decision maker receives a private signal s ∈ {l, h} about the state of the world. The more able is D, the more likely it is that her signal is reliable.
In particular, let p represent the ability of D and assume that Pr(s = w|w, p) = p. D knows p, which is drawn from a continuous density function f (p) on [.5, 1].
Given the prior q, and her own information (s, p), the decision maker D forms the following beliefs, according to Bayes rule:
where Pr(w = l|s, p, q) = 1 − Pr(w = h|s, p, q).
(ii) The information of E : The evaluator observes neither the signal s of the decision maker nor her type p, about which he forms beliefs. E knows that p is distributed on [. 5, 1] according to f (p). I assume that E observes the action a chosen by D, the realized state of the world ω, and the prior q.
The objectives of the players, strategies, and equilibria E updates his beliefs about p rationally. Denote E 0 s posterior expectations about p by π.
That is, π = E(p|q, w, a), where (q, w, a) is the information of E. The timing of the game:
1. q, the accuracy of the prior, is observed (where q = Pr(w = h) and q > 1 2 ).
2. w is realized and D receives a private signal, (s, p), about w.
3. D takes an action a.
4. w becomes observable and E forms beliefs on p, given a, w, q and f (p).
Benchmark: an efficient decision maker
As a benchmark, let us consider the behavior of an efficient decision maker, who cares only about taking the correct decision. This implies that she should take h if Pr(w = h|s, p, q) ≥ Pr(w = l|s, p, q). By (1), this implies that if s = h, the decision maker takes h, whereas if s = l, the decision maker takes h as long as p ≤ q. 12 Otherwise, if p > q, that is, her accuracy is greater than that of the prior, she takes l.
It is useful to describe such a cutoff point strategy in the following graph, which will accompany the analysis throughout. The right part of the graph describes the action of the decision maker when s = l, for p ranging from .5 to 1. The left part of the graph, describes the decision maker's action when s = h, and p ranges from .5 (in the middle) to 1 (in the left). Thus, as we go from left to right, Pr(w = l|s, p) increases. The cutoff point, which in the efficient case is at (s = l, p = q), is such that for all information (s, p) to the right of it, D takes l, whereas for all information (s, p) to its left, D takes h : 
Results
The incentives of the careerist decision maker are not necessarily aligned with efficient decision making, and hence she may distort her actions. I now analyze the behavior of the careerist decision maker in equilibrium and its sensitivity to the parameters of the model.
Let us define the following reputation function: π(a, w, α) is the expectations of E on D 0 s type, when E observes her action a, the state of the world w, and upon conjecturing some strategy α. 13 Essentially, E needs to update his beliefs about the density of each type, given the conjecture of α and the observation of a, w :
(Pr(s = w|w, p) Pr(α(s, p, q) = s) + Pr(s 6 = w|w, p) Pr(α(s, p, q) 6 = s))f (p)dp dp
Hence, π(a, a, α) denotes the reputation that D receives if she is correct (where a = w), whereas π(a, a 0 , α) denotes the reputation that she receives if she is wrong (a 6 = a 0 , a 0 = w).
Since D knows that E knows w, D believes that she receives the reputation π(a, a, α) if indeed she is correct. This occurs with Pr(w = a|s, p, q) which is defined in equation (1) . We 12 At s = l and p = q, Pr(w = h|s, p, q) = Pr(w = l|s, p, q). 13 I omit the index q from the beliefs of E, since given the observation of w, q may affect the beliefs of the evaluator only through the decision maker's strategy.
can therefore describe the utility of D from taking an action a, in the following way:
The first Lemma characterizes the strategy of the decision maker in any equilibrium.
Lemma 1
In any informative equilibrium, the decision maker uses a strategy α * which is characterized by a cutoff point (s * , p * ), such that the decision maker takes h if Pr(w = h|s, p, q) ≥ Pr(w = h|s * , p * , q), and otherwise she takes l. 
Proof:
In an informative equilibrium, some types of D take l whereas some types take h.
This implies that there must be at least one type (s, p) who is indifferent between taking l and h. That is, the following condition must hold for some (s, p) :
re-arranging, we get:
The right-hand-side of (2) is fixed for all (s, p), since these are the beliefs of the evaluator.
The evaluator does not know (s, p) and hence cannot condition his beliefs on this information.
The left-hand-side of (2), on the other hand, changes with (s, p). In particular:
For s = h, (3) is strictly increasing in p, and for s = l, (3) is strictly decreasing in p. Since both expressions are equal for p = 1 2 , there can be at most one pair (s * , p * ) that satisfies equation (2) . Thus, there is a unique cutoff point (s * , p * ), such that if Pr(w = h|s, p, q) ≥ Pr(w = h|s * , p * , q) the decision maker takes h, and otherwise, she takes l.¥
The strategy of the careerist decision maker is therefore similar to that of the efficient decision maker, who uses a cutoff strategy, with s * = l and p * = q. We therefore have to check what cutoff point the reputational incentives of the careerist decision maker induce her to choose. As a first step, we can impose more structure on the beliefs of the evaluator E whenever he conjectures that D uses a cutoff point strategy (s * , p * ):
Proof: see the appendix.¥
The Lemma follows from Bayesian updating. The first part asserts that the reputation of D is higher if she takes the correct decision; this can arise as a signal on ability since D is more likely to receive the correct signal when she is able, and her strategy is responsive to her signal. In addition, the lemma asserts the following; if s * = l, the reputation that E attributes to those who take l, whether they succeed or fail in taking the right decision, is higher than the reputation they receive when they take h. Intuitively, when s * = l, D takes l only if p > p * (as in Figure 1 , which describes an efficient decision maker). Hence, E knows that if a = l, it must be that p > p * , whereas if a = h, D may admit a lower type, of p < p * .
The opposite happens when s * = h (as in the example described in Figure 2 ). In this case, higher reputation is attributed to those who take h.
Given Lemma 2, the next result helps us to focus our analysis:
Proof: To find an equilibrium, we have to find the cutoff point that satisfies the following fixed point equation (that is, equation (2) with correct beliefs for the evaluator):
Assume now that s * = h. Such a value implies that the right-hand-side of (4) is smaller than 1 by Lemma 2, whereas the left-hand-side of (4) is greater than 1 by equation (3) . As a result, s * = h cannot solve (4).¥ Intuitively, when the prior is contradicted by too many types of the decision maker, the evaluator may realize that a decision maker who contradicts is not necessarily an able one.
Higher reputation would be attributed to those who follow the prior. Moreover, types with s = h, are more likely to take the right decision when they follow the prior and hence receive a high reputation (as well as θ). This implies that all types with s = h would rather follow the prior, so no such type can be indifferent. A cutoff point with s * = h cannot be sustained.
Given that s * = l in equilibrium, we can now concentrate our analysis on finding p * . Note that if in equilibrium, p * = q, then it implies that the decision maker behaves efficiently. We can say that the decision maker behaves more (less) efficiently the closer (further) is p * to q. If p * > q, it means that the decision maker takes h even when she thinks that w is more likely to be l. This is what we call excessively following the prior, or 'herding'. If, on the other hand, the equilibrium value admits p * < q, the decision maker takes l even when she thinks that w is more likely to be h. This is what we call excessively contradicting the prior, or 'anti-herding'. 14 The first Proposition establishes that anti-herding arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (the Anti-Herding result): For all θ ≥ 0, there exists a unique informative equilibrium. In this equilibrium, anti-herding arises and the decision maker excessively contradicts the prior. The decision maker behaves more efficiently when outcome concerns are stronger. Also, when the accuracy of the prior q increases, the decision maker follows the prior more often. However, when career concerns are strong enough, then no matter how high q is, a distortion always arises.
Proof: see the appendix.¥ In equilibrium, a trade-off is created between two types of signals: contradicting the prior and taking the right decision. In order to focus on the reputational trade-off, assume that 14 My definition of herding and anti-herding is similar to that of Prendergast and Stole (1996) . θ = 0, i.e., the decision maker has only career concerns. First, contradicting the prior is a signal for high ability. This is so because only the most able decision makers take this route.
On the other hand, taking the correct action always enhances reputation because it indicates that the decision maker has received, on average, a correct signal.
Consider now a type with p < q. When this type follows the prior, she is more likely to take the correct decision, since she utilizes more information. As taking the correct decision is a signal for high ability, this increases her reputation. On the other hand, if she contradicts the prior she receives high reputation. But, she is more likely to be wrong and receive the low reputation attached to a failure. Formally,
in equilibrium, but when a type p < q contradicts the prior she is more likely to receive π(l, h, α) whereas when she follows the prior she is more likely to receive π(h, h, α), where
Thus, low types cannot fully mimic the able types who contradict the prior, because they are more likely to fail. The evaluator knows the state of the world and can 'punish' those that take the wrong decision by holding them, and rightly so, in lower regard. Thus, the tension between the two types of incentives determines the equilibrium level of contradiction.
To see that excessive contradiction must arise, i.e., that p * < q, note that otherwise, if p * ≥ q, no trade-off arises. Both the reputation from contradicting the prior is higher at any state, and also types with p ≥ q are more likely to take the right decision when they contradict the prior, and hence receive high reputation for being correct. Thus, no type with p ≥ q can be indifferent, implying that in equilibrium p * < q.
The proposition also characterizes the decision maker's behavior as a function of the parameters of the model, q and θ. Intuitively, when q increases, the benefit from following the prior, everything else being equal, is higher. This is because the terms of the reputational trade-off change; it becomes more likely to receive the (higher) reputation for taking the correct decision. Hence, more types are inclined to follow the prior, that is, the cutoff point p * increases. 15 However, the Proposition states that for small values of θ, efficiency, or a behavior which is close to efficient, cannot be achieved for all values of q. The implication of this result is that 15 This only implies that more types follow the prior but not necessarily that the size of the distortion, i.e., q − p * is smaller. Note for example that when q → 1 2 , the distortion is the smallest since the decision maker behaves efficiently; without almost any prior public knowledge about what is the right state, the only way to signal ability is by taking the correct decision.
the distortion due to career concerns is substantial; even if q admits high values, for example q → 1, the cutoff point p * is strictly below 1 and there is a positive measure of types who behave inefficiently. For example, when θ = 0 and the density over types f (p) is uniform, I
find that p * is bounded by 0.625. Thus, when q → 1, all types in (0.625, 1) take the wrong decision, consciously and inefficiently.
To see why p * is bounded, consider the case of θ = 0. Note that if the evaluator conjectures that p * is very high, for example p
That is, the reputation from contradicting the prior is higher than that from following the prior regardless of the state of the world, since those who contradict the prior are only the most able types, with
e., even if the decision maker contradicts the prior and is found wrong, her reputation is higher compared to the scenario in which she follows the prior and is found correct. Thus, if these are the beliefs of the evaluator, any type of decision maker would rather contradict the prior. This implies that such beliefs for the evaluator cannot be sustained, for any q. Consequently, there is an upper bound on the cutoff point. 16 Finally, note that in terms of the objectives of the decision maker, career concerns are an important condition; in particular, the distortion becomes smaller when the reputation motive decreases, and in the limit, when career concerns vanish, the decision maker behaves efficiently. Moreover, the Proposition illustrates that anti-herding arises when the decision maker is solely motivated by career concerns, i.e., even in the absence of outcome concerns. Proof: see the appendix.¥ 16 The feature that p * is bounded for all values of q will turn out to be important, since it implies that when q is high enough anti-herding must arise in an informative equilibrium, even if we change some of the assumptions of the model. 17 Prendergast and Stole (1996) assume the existence of outcome concerns in order to derive a fully separating equilibrium. I show that at least for a semi-separating equilibrium, career concerns are enough.
I now explain the intuition of the result, which illustrates the robustness of anti-herding and the conditions under which it prevails. I find that anti-herding arises only if E observes the action of the decision maker, or more precisely, whether the decision maker follows or contradicts the prior. Otherwise, D can only signal her type by taking the correct decision and will therefore behave efficiently.
In terms of the information that D holds, I find that a crucial assumption is that D knows her type p. Intuitively, if the decision maker does not know p, she does not know whether her own information is more accurate than the prior and as a result cannot signal it. She only knows her signal s, and can only report information about s. This implies that the only way in which she can signal her type is by taking the correct decision. 18 The Proposition shows that other assumptions are not important. For example, a common assumption in the literature is that both E and D observe the accuracy of the prior q.
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Here, I show that the anti-herding result can be generalized beyond this assumption. Even if each of them does not know the exact accuracy of the prior, they both know whether D contradicts or follows the prior. Hence, the same trade-off described above can arise.
Finally, consider the scenario in which E does not observe w. This is highly relevant, since for many decisions, it is never known whether they are correct or not. 20 Two problems arise in this case. The first is to ensure that an informative equilibrium exists, for all θ ≥ 0. 21 The second is to ensure that anti-herding arises in equilibrium. But this is solved using the insight gained in Proposition 1. The result there established that the cutoff point p * is bounded 18 Effinger and Polborn (2001) derive anti-herding in a set up in which decision makers do not know their type. They assume that there is a direct competition between experts, i.e., that a decision maker is valuable only if she is considered the only smart decision maker. In this case, decision makers have an incentive to differentiate themselves. The implication is therefore that decision makers must know their type for anti-herding to arise, if career concerns are individualistic. 19 I know of no paper in the herding/anti-herding literature that assumes differently. 20 Consider for example judicial decision making. If there is no appeal, it is likely that we never find out whether the judge is right or wrong. See Levy (2002) . 21 When the evaluator does not observe w he cannot discipline the decision maker by 'providing' her incentives to take the right decision. This is an obstacle for an informative equilibrium only when θ = 0, since when θ > 0 the decision maker is inherently motivated by taking the correct decision. I show in the appendix that an informative equilibrium can exist even when θ = 0. In the equilibrium, the decision maker behaves informatively but each of her types is indifferent between contradicting and following the prior. The only other paper that analyzes a career concerns model in which E does not observe w is Prendergast and Stole (1996) . In their model they indeed substitute this assumption by assuming sufficiently high outcome concerns. I show that this is not necessary, neither for existence nor for anti-herding.
and cannot be 'too high', so that the interval of distortion (p * , q) has a positive measure. If p * is too high, then regardless of the state of the world, the reputation from contradicting must be higher than that from following, which cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Since this occurs regardless of the state of the world, it must be true also when E cannot observe w. The cutoff point is bounded in this case as well, for the same reason. As a result, when q is high enough, the cutoff is below q and anti-herding arises.
The 'anti-herding' effect may create implications above and beyond those described above. In what follows, I analyze extensions of the model to explore some of these implications.
Extensions
So far, I assumed that there exists a known prior, which indicates that the state of the world is likely to be h, with an accuracy q > . Alternatively, we can model the formation of this 'prior' by assuming that it is based on previous information or advice which is public and freely available to the decision maker. This allows us to endogenize some of the assumptions about the parameter q.
Assume that the initial prior is the symmetric one, i.e., that each state can occur with probability 1 2 . There is an adviser who receives a signal about the state of the world. The accuracy of the adviser's signal is known to be q. If the adviser transmits his signal truthfully (and publicly), then this structure is exactly identical to the structure assumed in the model.
In the first extension, I analyze how much information the decision maker aggregates before she takes her decision. That is, I allow the decision maker to decide whether to consult the adviser or not and thus control the accuracy of her 'prior'.
Strategic information aggregation
An adviser A receives a signal s A ∈ {l, h}, with accuracy q. That is, Pr(s
The players E and D know the parameter q. In the first stage of the game, the decision maker can decide whether to consult her adviser or not, given q, her own information (s, p) and the initial symmetric prior on the state of the world. I assume that consultation is costless and that the adviser transmits his signal s A truthfully upon consultation. I also assume that the decision whether to consult or not is observed by the evaluator E. The timing of the game is therefore the following:
1. It is common knowledge that Pr(w = h) = 1 2 and that Pr(s A = w|w, q) = q.
w is realized, A learns s
A ∈ {l, h}, and D receives a private signal (s, p) about w.
D may consult A and learn s
4. D takes an action a.
5. E forms beliefs on p, given a, w, q, the decision to consult, s A if she consults, and f (p).
The efficient course of action is for D to consult the adviser and follow his advice when p < q and follow her own signal s when p > q. But will D necessarily aggregate information?
Intuitively, if D decides not to gather additional information, she reduces the likelihood of taking the appropriate action. But taking the correct action based only on her own information, is a more challenging test than doing so after collecting advice. The willingness of a decision maker to impose this test upon herself may show that she has faith in her own private information. To find if the decision not to consult can arise as a signal on ability, Proposition 3 identifies an equilibrium in which some types consult and some do not.
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Proposition 3 (The Strategic Consultation Result): When θ is sufficiently high, there exists an equilibrium in which some types do not consult. In particular, the most able decision makers do not consult and follow their own signal whereas the less able decision makers consult and follow advice. Moreover, distortion arises since decision makers with types p < q do not consult as well.
Proof: see the appendix.¥ Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium behavior of the decision maker, given some signal s and types p ∈ [.5, 1]. In equilibrium, all types with p > p 0 do not consult and follow their own signal, i.e., take a = s. All other types, i.e., p ∈ (.5, p 0 ), consult and follow advice (a = s A ).
The area (p 0 , q) describes the inefficiency created by career concerns. 22 An equilibrium in the model is defined by an equilibrium in each of the continuation games calculated given some beliefs of E that a type p that consults belongs to the set C ⊆ [.5, 1] and a type p that acts unilaterally belongs to the set U = [.5, 1]\C, and by the condition that a decision maker of type p ∈ U prefers to act unilaterally and a decision maker of type p ∈ C prefers to consult. I focus on symmetric strategies, that is, the decision to consult depends on p but not on the content of s (since at the first decision node, the prior is symmetric). In this equilibrium, the following trade-off arises. Consulting an adviser may increase the probability of taking the right decision (and receiving θ). However, choosing not to consult allows the decision maker to be perceived as a high ability type, since only able types choose to decide alone. 23 Obviously, able types have sufficiently accurate information so they can opt for high reputation, whereas the less able types need to rely on advice in order to receive θ and solve the trade-off by favouring consultation. Since the equilibrium separates between those who do not consult, the most able, and those who consult, the least able, it can exist only for high values of θ. Otherwise, the less able types are not 'willing' to distinguish themselves. Finally, the equilibrium reveals inefficient behavior on behalf of the decision maker; as in the previous result, the cutoff point is lower than q and hence some types with p < q distort their actions by not consulting, in order to signal high ability.
Consider now an equilibrium in which all types consult. 23 Intuitively, if reputation for acting unilaterally would be low, then none of the decision maker's types would follow this route, which is inferior to consulting and following advice both in terms of career and outcome concerns. 24 For all θ, such an equilibrium can be sustained with proper out-of-equilibrium beliefs for the evaluator. When D can choose whether to consult, there may exist two equilibria with a similar structure. In both, the most able decision makers act on the basis of their own information only (i.e., ignore information or do not collect it), whereas the less able decision makers follow advice. As a result, the signal of not consulting and the signal of contradicting advice may be substitutable; both D's decision whether to consult or not and her choice of how to use the advice she obtains can serve as signalling devices.
It is therefore interesting to investigate which of the equilibria described in Figures 4 and 5 is more efficient, i.e., which yields higher probability of taking the right decision:
25 Proposition 4 The probability of making the right decision is higher when the decision maker signals her type by contradicting advice.
Proof: see the appendix.¥ Intuitively, in the equilibrium in which the most able decision makers signal their type by not consulting (Figure 4) there is a high degree of separation between types. Since the decision to consult is public, all the types who do not consult distinguish themselves from less able types. On the other hand, the equilibrium in which contradicting advice is a signal of ability ( Figure 5 ) is characterized by a high degree of pooling; the more able decision makers ignore advice but if the adviser's recommendation agrees with their signal, they appear as if they 'follow' advice. This allows the less able decision makers to mimic the most able decision makers more often. 26 Since the signal of not consulting is stronger, relatively more types are tempted to use it and distort their action. As a result, the equilibrium in which this signal is used is less efficient. In other words, p 0 < p * < q.
Strategic advisers
So far I assumed that the adviser A transmits his information truthfully. I now endogenize the behavior of the adviser. In particular, the adviser may be careerist as well. Assume 25 I thank a referee for suggesting this question. 26 This is the reason why the equilibria in which decision makers ignore advice can be sustained for all values of θ, as opposed to the equilibrium in which some decision makers do not consult.
therefore that the accuracy of the adviser q is unknown to E and D, but they know its density function g(q) over [. 5, 1] . Let the utility function of A be π A + θ A I, where π A are the beliefs of E on the type of A and θ A ≥ 0 measures how much A cares about the outcome.
Finally, I allow the adviser A to transmit a message about (s A , q) which is not necessarily truthful. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. It is common knowledge that Pr(w = h) = 1 2 .
2. w is realized, A receives a signal (s A , q) and D receives a signal (s, p) about w.
A transmits a message
4. D takes an action a given m, g(q), and (s, p).
5. E forms beliefs π on p, and π A on q, given a, m, w, f (p) and g(q).
It is then easy to prove the following:
Proposition 5 (The Sub-optimal Sharing of Information Result): For all θ A , there is no equilibrium in which the adviser always reveals his information (s A , q).
Proof: see the appendix.¥ Intuitively, consider an adviser who reflects whether to exaggerate the accuracy of his report. If he poses as a more talented adviser, less types of the decision maker distort their action, since they face a more accurate prior or advice. The decision maker is therefore induced to behave more efficiently. This implies that if the adviser exaggerates his report, he increases both his reputation, and the probability of receiving θ A . He therefore has an incentive to fool the decision maker and an equilibrium with full information revelation cannot exist. Thus, even if the adviser is only concerned about the outcome and has no concerns about his reputation, i.e., for θ A → ∞, he cannot transmit his information fully, since he knows that the careerist decision maker distorts her actions and abuses his information.
To summarize, consultation in the presence of career concerns elicits low quality of information. Although the career concerns of the adviser and the decision maker are not conflicting, since they are not competing for the same job, the personal career concerns of either blocks truthful information revelation. 27 27 I do not fully characterize the equilibria in the case of strategic advisers. In a companion working paper (Levy, 2000) I show that contradicting an adviser still arises as a signal for high ability even in the presence of strategic advisers.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how a decision maker who is concerned about her career distorts her decision by 'anti-herding'. Following several papers that have introduced anti-herding results in different contexts, the paper generalizes this result and illustrates the necessary conditions for its derivation. Career concerns are a necessary condition, and as long as career concerns are individualistic, that is, the decision maker does not care about the reputation of others, she must know her ability (type). Other assumptions are irrelevant. Anti-herding is the unique informative equilibrium behavior even if the decision maker cares only for reputation and has no outcome concerns. Anti-herding arises for any distribution over types, and even when the signals of smart decision makers are not correlated. Finally, it arises if the evaluator observes the environment only partially, i.e., he does not observe the state of the world or the accuracy of the public prior.
show that
for p ≥ p 0 with a strict inequality for at least one pair of values p and p 0 . We will show that the MLRP is satisfied in this case, since
increases with p.
Given that the decision maker uses a cutoff strategy, then she takes l only when s = l and p > p * . Hence:
Hence,
increases in p. A similar analysis holds for a = h.
Similarly to part (i), I show that when s * = l, R 1 5 pf (p|l, l, α * )dp > R 1
.5
pf (p|h, h, α * )dp and R 1 .5
pf (p|l, h, α * )dp > R 1
pf (p|h, l, α * )dp by using the MLRP. To see that R 1
pf (p|l, l, α * )dp > R 1 .5
pf (p|h, h, α * )dp, I have to show that
= 0 if p < p * , hence the result follows. Similarly, to see that
pf (p|h, l, α * )dp, we have to show that
increases with p, but it is trivial since
The analogous results for s * = h, part (iii), follow from symmetry.¥
Proof of Proposition 1:
In particular, I will show that there is a unique cutoff point p * (q, θ) which satisfies p * (q, θ) < q, that the cutoff p * (q, θ) is increasing in θ and in q, and that when θ is sufficiently small, p * (q, θ) is bounded for all q.
The proof of Lemma 3 establishes that the equilibrium (s * , p * ) solves
and that the solution admits s * = l. Consider now the case of p * ≥ q. By Lemma 2, the right-hand-side of (5) is greater than 1, whereas by (3) the left-hand-side of (5) is smaller than 1. Hence, a solution exists by continuity and it admits s * = l and p * < q. It is left to show the properties of p * (q, θ) and its uniqueness.
Step 1: Characterizing the upper bound on p * (q, θ) :
Let s * = l. I will now show that there exists a uniquep > .5, such that for all p
with equality only for p =p. This shows that in equilibrium, p * (q, θ) <p.
f (p)dp + R 1 p * pf (p)dp dp +
f (p)dp + R 1 p * pf (p)dp dp Taking the derivative of π(h, h, α * ) w.r.t p * , it is 
. Denote this value byp. Note thatp < p 0 and thatp is unique.
Step 2: Uniqueness: by step 1, when p * ∈ [.5,p], dπ(l,w,α * ) dp * > 0 and dπ(h,h,α * ) dp * < 0. A similar analysis as in step 1 holds for dπ(h,l,α * ) dp * < 0. This implies that ∂ ∂p * k θ (α * ) > 0, and hence the solution is unique.
Step 3: The cutoff point p * (q, θ) is increasing in q and in θ :
To see that p * (q, θ) is increasing in q, I take the total differentiation of the equilibrium condition:
Pr(w=h|s * ,p * ,q) Pr(w=l|s * ,p * ,q)
Thus,
Step 2, and
To see that the solution increases in θ, note that when θ is higher, implying that p * (q, θ) is higher.¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proposition involves several claims which will be shown separately in different steps.
Step 1: If E does not observe w, there exists a unique informative equilibrium, in which the decision maker anti-herds whenever q is high enough.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium in which D behaves as in Proposition 1. That is, there exists a cutoff point (s 0 , p 0 ) such that she takes h iff Pr(w = h|s, p, q) ≥ Pr(w = h|s 0 , p 0 , q). Assume also that s 0 = l. If E believes that this is her strategy, then given each action, he can updates his beliefs about the state of the world. In particular, denote by q a (α 0 ), E's beliefs that w = a given an action a. These believes can be updated by Bayes rule. Then an equilibrium is a solution to the fixed point equation:
The right-hand-side (left-hand-side) is the expected utility of the decision maker from taking l(h). Consider
. Since by Lemma 2 in this case the reputation for following and contradicting is equal, the left-hand-side is larger than the right-hand-side.
On the other hand, for p 0 → 1, and since in particular p 0 >p, wherep is the value of the cutoff point which satisfies π(l, h, α) = π(h, h, α) and is defined in the proof of Proposition 1, the right-hand-side is higher than the left-hand-side. Thus, an equilibrium exists for all values of q. But also, for high enough values of q, if p 0 > q >p, the right-hand-side is larger than the left-hand-side, implying by continuity that in equilibrium p 0 < q. Hence, whenever q >p, this equilibrium must involve anti-herding.¤
Step 2: Anti-herding arises disregarding whether E or D observe q or not.
Proof: Proposition 1 proves the case when both observe q. When D does not observe q, then she believes that she is found correct with probability
if she follows the prior and
if she contradicts the prior. This is true no matter if E observes q or not since E observes w, and hence D has only to conjecture what is the probability that the state is h or l. Thus, the equilibrium is equivalent to the one withq = E(q). Finally, the case where E does not observe q but D does, is analyzed in Levy (2000) and I refer the reader to the proof there.¤
Step 3: When D does not know p, in any informative equilibrium, she behaves efficiently, i.e., she follows her signal for E(p) > q and follows the prior if E(p) < q.
Proof: I will show the claim for θ = 0. The result then must hold for positive values of θ, since these values only increase the motivation to take the right decision. The expected utility from taking an action a is Pr(a = w|s, q)π(a, a, α) + (1 − Pr(a = w|s, q))π(a, a 0 , α)
where
When D does not know her type, she can contingent her strategy only on her signal s, that is, whether s = h or s = l. Hence, α(s, p, q) = α(s, q) for all p. For brevity, let us denote the probability with which D follows her signal by α s . Then in equilibrium,
p)dp dp and analogously we can define the rest. We now consider equilibria in which either α l < 1 or α h < 1 (but not both since there cannot be an informative equilibrium such that a decision maker is indifferent given both signals). It is first easy to see using the MLRP that if α l < (=)1 and α h = (<)1, then π(l, l, α) > (<)π(h, h, α) and π(l, h, α) > (<)π(h, l, α). Also, for any a, π(a, a, α) > π(a, a 0 , α). I will now show α h = 1. Assume that α h < 1 and therefore α l = 1. This implies that the reputation from h is higher than the reputation from l. Then, for any q and E(p), it is better to take h when s = h, implying that α h = 1. Now, when E(p) > q, it also has to be that α l = 1. Assume to the contrary that α l < 1.
Then the reputation from l is higher then the reputation from h. If E(p) > q, then it is the case that when s = l, there is a higher probability that the state is l. Then, it has to be that D takes l, so α l < 1 is not an equilibrium. We conclude that when E(p) > q, it must be that α l = α h = 1, and hence the decision maker follows her signal. Finally, we need to show that when E(p) < q, α l = 0. The proof shows that for any α l ≤ 1, the utility from taking h when s = l is higher than from s = l. pf (p)dp dp,
where π N (a, a 0 , α 0 ) can be similarly defined. It is easy to see, by MLRP, that π N (a, a, α 0 ) > π N (a, a 0 , α 0 ).We can therefore express the expected utility from not consulting, given the conjecture of the equilibrium, by pπ N (a, a, α 0 ) + (1 − p)π N (a, a 0 , α 0 ) + pθ When the decision maker consults for all p < p 0 (q, θ) and follows advice, her reputation is (where the superscript A denotes consulting the adviser A):
f (p)dp dp = π A (a, a 0 , α 0 ) , then for high enough θ, the left-hand-side is higher from the right-hand-side because q > p 0 (q, θ), implying that the solution p 0 (q, θ) > 1 2
. On the other hand, when p 0 (q, θ) ≥ q, then the utility from not consulting is higher than that from consulting since both the reputation from not consulting is higher and the probability of receiving θ. Hence, an equilibrium exists and satisfies p 0 (q, θ) < q.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the equilibrium in which all types consult and the most able types ignore advice. It is trivial to show that this equilibrium is analogous to the one described in Proposition 1.
Consider now the cutoff point p * (q, θ) in this equilibrium. Re-arranging the equilibrium condition, it solves:
where π f (a, a, α * ) is the reputation from following advice while taking the correct decision, π c (a, a, α * )
is the reputation from contradicting advice and taking the correct decision, and so on. Now consider the equilibrium fixed point equation when some types do not consult, i.e., the equilibrium described in Proposition π N (a, w, α * ) = π c (a, w, α * ); π A (a, w, α * ) < π f (a, w, α * ) < π c (a, w, α * )
Given the above, I now plug the solution of the fixed point equation p * (q, θ) from (7) to the fixed point equation inp(q, θ) above. It is then easy to show that: π A (a, a, α * ) < p * (q, θ)π N (a, a, α * ) + (1 − p * (q, θ))π N (a, a 0 , α * ) + (p * (q, θ) − q)θ which implies that at p * (q, θ), the decision maker rather not consult, and hence the solution to the fixed point equation must admit a lower level of p, i.e.,p(q, θ) < p * (q, θ).¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
If A reveals all his information truthfully, given a message (s A , q), the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 1. But then a deviation of a type q to a report of q + ε increases both the efficiency of decision making (and induces a higher probability to receive θ A ) and the beliefs of E.
Thus, no type can report his type truthfully.¥ 29 29 The proof actually illustrates that the adviser cannot transmit truthfully any connected interval.
